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To provide a baseline for this discussion, let me quote a simple definition of norms that 
is not normativist.
A norm . . . is the propensity to feel shame and to anticipate sanctions by others at the 
thought of behaving in a certain, forbidden way. As explained earlier, this propensity 
becomes a social norm when and to the extent that it is shared with other people. As 
will be explained, the social character of the norm is also manifest in the existence of 
higher-order norms that enjoin us to punish violators of the first-order norm. To repeat, 
this conception of a network of shared beliefs and common emotional reactions does 
not commit us to thinking of norms as supraindividual entities that somehow exist inde-
pendently of their supports. (Elster 1989: 105)
These reactions are psychological in character: there is no trace here of the notion 
of validity, and the facts about attitudes are individual rather than collective, as Elster 
makes clear. What makes the pattern a norm rather than, say, a product of market choi-
ces, is the character of the feelings: shame, guilt, and anxiety. Normativism insists on 
something quite different: that there is something to norms more than a pattern sustai-
ned by common individual psychological propensities to react in certain ways, and the 
something more is collective, shared, or intrinsic, and has some sort of force. 
The argument of Explaining the Normative (2010) did not depend on Elster’s account 
of norms, but was concerned with the various forms of “something more” claims by nor-
mativists. And the critical commentary on the book has mostly been concerned to argue 
that there is some sort of “more” to norms, or that some of the normative things discus-
sed by normativists cannot be reduced to the normal facts of science, cause, or social 
science explanation.
A number of issues intersect here, which makes this a particularly tangled set of 
issues. I cannot untangle them all, but I will try to explain the tangle itself. We can cut 
though many of these issues by narrowing down the problem. Laws, the rules of games, 
and so forth are explicit norms. They are the sorts of things about which one can have 
beliefs, make claims, and so forth in an unambiguous way. They can be derived from 
other norms —authorized, deduced, or warranted by other norms. Their normativity is 
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derivative from other norms, or some norm-making process, unless they are ur-norms of 
some kind that are self-authorizing or just true. They don’t claim any intrinsic validity or 
special causal powers. These cases are not at issue here. 
Tacit norms, however, are different. Their normativity cannot be derived. The cases 
we are interested in are those which are self-authorizing or have power as rules. Nor-
mally these rules are made explicit only retrospectively or on the basis of observation, 
such as rules of etiquette in etiquette books, which derive their authority from their claim 
to describe what the right kind of people do. Consequently, claims about the existence 
and content of tacit norms are closer to empirical claims: they depend on what people do 
and what “error” is and what reaction it produces. Often, for example in the case of the 
norms described in etiquette books, they take the form of advice that seems to be largely 
pragmatic. And this raises the question of what sort of correctness and thus normativity 
is at stake.
There is correctness and there is correctness: correctness in accordance with some 
sort of normative fact or property, the correctness of the normativist, and pragmatic 
and pragmatic social or interactional correctness, that is to say, what works and what 
is accepted as correct. In my view, intelligibility also falls into this category: it is pragma-
tic success in understanding and making oneself understood. If the “normative fact” is 
merely the reaction of shame felt by others and oneself on the occasion of one’s failure 
to act correctly in the socially pragmatic sense of “correct,” there is still no “more”. Nor-
mativism says there is more.
In my view there is nothing more than pragmatic or socially pragmatic correctness 
at the tacit level. The illusion that there is something more comes from the fact that tacit 
norms can be normativized by explicit beliefs about them, such as the belief, in the case 
of the etiquette books, that the patterns being described are “social obligations,” or that 
conformity to them is evidence of some sort of goodness, or any other belief that replaces 
mere pragmatic correctness with normative correctness. 
There is a parallel here with a question that is often answered in the opposite way: 
is tacit knowledge really “knowledge?” Many philosophers say it is not. There can be no 
“justification” for tacit knowledge; by definition it is not a claim, and it otherwise fails to 
resemble real knowledge. Similar problems vex the idea of tacit truth. It is odd to say 
that tacit “beliefs” are true or even that they are beliefs. The only sense in which tacit 
knowledge is belief is that we attribute “beliefs” or their equivalent to ourselves and others 
because they repair enthymemes, i.e., they are suppressed premises for some sort of 
inference that we are explaining. But there is always a question of whether these beliefs 
were there, prior to their attribution, or whether as a matter of psychology the person was 
simply making the inference which another person took to be enthymematic. Here the 
inaccessibility of the tacit becomes relevant: we simply don’t have a way of making the 
tacit explicit, at least in the sense of actually saying what the tacit mental contents of a 
mind are (cf. Turner 2012).
These issues carry over to the problem of tacit norms. One can ask whether there 
can even be such a thing as a tacit norm. Nevertheless, for historical reasons associated 
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with Wittgenstein, we are very familiar with some usages that obscure the peculiarities 
of tacitness. The notion of rule, which Jeroslav Peregrin raises in his discussion of social 
normativity, is a case in point. “Rule” has a primary non-tacit sense —it is an explicit rule, 
authorized, and “normative” because it is authorized. It has an analogical sense, of a 
rule-like thing that does such things as distinguish correct and incorrect uses of terms. 
But if the normativity of an actual rule comes from its source, where does the normativity 
of a tacit rule come from? 
That this is a good question is shown by the fact that normativists have tried to give 
answers to it. In ETN I discussed Sellars’s idea that it came from collective intentions that 
back it: this is the point of his famous example of the sentence “we disapprove of women 
smoking, but I don’t” which is intelligible because the first part is a report of a collec-
tive intention. Searle had a similar argument, at one point, and even invented supposed 
mental states of we-intending to go along with it. Brandom invoked societal reactions: a 
kind of collective fact. Kantians like Korsgaard wanted to make normative reason into 
its own psychological force. Others, such as Boghossian, wished to swallow enormities. 
I think these answers show that the problem is misconceived. There can be no nor-
mativity for tacit rules other than the pragmatic sense of correctness if it is taken to 
include pragmatic success in social interactions, which involve making oneself unders-
tood. Learning the norms, after all, is a pragmatic, empathic process —nothing non-natu-
ral happens. Normative correctness has no place in the tacit. It seems to appear where 
facts are described in a certain way. But the descriptions invariably sneak in something 
“normative” (such as “mutual accountability,” see Rouse 2007: 669) that can be given an 
empirically adequate description in non-normative terms. 
José Antonio Noguera quotes Weber to the effect that “The rational, in the sense of the 
logical or teleological ‘consistency’ of an intellectual-theoretical or practical-ethical stand, 
exerts and has always exerted power over men”; and points out that he even called this “the 
effect of ratio.” Noguera claims that this is meant in a normative sense of reason. But the 
natural interpretation of this text is that there is a psychological fact of a drive of some sort 
to logical or practical consistency, not a normative force. For Weber, normative rationality 
does have a role, but as an ideal-type which is especially intelligible. We can use it as a way 
into the understanding of actual action, which typically deviates from it. 
Nothing in the book excludes evolutionary explanations, or ideas about the psycholo-
gical differential attractiveness of ideas. These are facts about psychology, not normative 
validity. And of course nothing in the book would prevent Weber from using these terms 
‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ in their psychological and pragmatic sense, and in terms of ideal-
typical (meaning specifically non-normative or “ideal”) notions of rationality. None of this 
would have anything to do with rational validity in the normative sense, and Weber stres-
sed that the “ideal” in ideal-type was not meant in a normative sense. 
This is the normal explanatory situation for such things as decision theory: there is a 
real psychological process of decision making, which deviates from decision theory, and 
which we can theorize about in terms of biases in the fashion of Daniel Kahneman. Since 
Milton Friedman’s Essays in Positive Economics (1953), people have distinguished nor-
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mative uses of these kinds of concepts from empirical ones, and defended the use of 
what are obviously simplifications of actual psychological processes on the grounds that 
they work as predictions on a mass level. None of these people are normativists, in the 
sense discussed in the book. The only rationality operating as a cause in any of these 
cases is psychological and “natural.” 
Noguera also argues that normative reason enters into contemporary social science 
explanations in another way, through the notion of falsity as it appears in explanations 
of false belief and ignorance. This argument is, I think, misdirected. There is no need, 
in the examples of explanations he gives, to appeal to normative truth and falsity. It 
is sufficient to have an asymmetry in which one would prefer an alternative to one’s 
beliefs if one had more information. It is quite sufficient in such cases to refer to things 
taken to be true and things that would be taken to be true by the people in question 
—actual “normative” truth is irrelevant. Similarly for feedback: pragmatic correctness is 
enough. 
Jesús Zamora-Bonilla’s comment raises the question of whether I am an eliminativist 
who wants to get rid of meanings and oughts. I don’t see this as a problem of reductio-
nism, but as another aspect of the problem of tacitness. When the rule, norm, etc. are 
tacit, we can comment on them, as patterns, say something about “correctness” based 
on our observational knowledge or self-knowledge, and so forth. But the determining 
thing itself is still tacit. “Meanings” and “oughts,” similarly, can only be theories of what 
is going on in the tacit: there is always still a question of whether they do so accurately. 
Explicit laws and rules are a different matter: their oughts and meanings can be matters 
of explicit definition. They aren’t controlled by tacit facts. But their apparent “normativity” 
does depend on them being laws, or correct definitions. In contrast, tacit rules have to 
“consist,” in Zamora-Bonilla’s sense, in what people actually do. The issue, in short, is 
whether there is a shadow world of oughts and meanings that relates somehow to what 
actually happens, and makes it normative. This I do wish to eliminate.
Davidson’s discussion of rationality, I have argued elsewhere, is careful to formulate 
these issues in terms of “beliefs,” rather than “inferential” terms, such as “concepts.” I 
think he would have said that my following your reasoning includes following your mis-
taken but intelligible reasoning, but that the test of mistakenness is not to be found in the 
reasoning, but in the falsity of the beliefs. If your reasoning is intelligible to me, it is reaso-
ning. If the result is something that I cannot believe, it is not the reasoning that is at fault, 
but something in the web of belief. The example I gave is inferences involving contagion. 
We understand them, even if we do not believe in contagion; the person making the infe-
rences does believe something we do not. This is why Davidson claims to have a “rudi-
mentary” notion of rationality and a “flexible” notion of reasonable belief, and says “The 
issue is not whether we all agree on exactly what the norms of rationality are; the point is 
that we all have such norms and we cannot recognize as thought phenomenon that are 
too far out of line” (quoted in Turner 2011: 366). I disagree with Davidson to this extent: 
I think the use of “norms” is gratuitous here. The point can be naturalized as follows: the 
limits of intelligibility are the limits of our empathic capacities in following reasoning. 
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Antonio Gaitán-Torres makes an interesting attempt to find the meta-ethics in ETN or 
one that fits with it. I tried, as he sees, to avoid committing to any meta-ethical account. 
He suggests that the book fits with expressivism, though he notes that some expressi-
visms, such as Brandom’s, do not fit. I would draw the line a little differently. The main 
distinction I would make here again would be between the tacit and the explicit. Expres-
sivism makes sense as an attempt to articulate the tacit. This fits, very roughly, with 
Gibbard’s (former) argument that what one is expressing is some set of norms (Gibbard 
1990: 46), which presumably are tacit. I would also assimilate most appeals to intuition to 
the articulation of the tacit: even Korsgaard makes some sense in these terms, as promo-
ting reflection on tacit norms that explicitly justifies them. Velleman’s “kinda-Kantianism” 
identified a tropism toward intelligibility as the backing force (which comes very close 
to naturalization by way of empathy, as it is developed in ETN). But I do not need to be 
committed to any of these.
The explicit itself I would treat differently. My appeal to Friedman’s notion of a nor-
mative lens fits with Dworkin’s idea of the independence of questions of morality and 
value and his insistence that only moral arguments can produce moral conclusions. And 
I am sympathetic to Parfit’s idea that explicit normative statements are factual but have 
no explanatory psychological force. Neither of them is a normativist, in my sense. Some 
explicit moral theory is clearly fiction, or what I called Good Bad Theory, in the sense of 
Joyce. Tabu is a Good Bad Theory that powerfully organizes moral experience and life 
where it is accepted. Joyce is one of the few philosophers to discuss it, and his fictiona-
lism fits it nicely. My reluctance to choose between these meta-ethical theories reflects 
my sense that the objects that fall into the category of the moral or ethical, especially 
as used cross-culturally, are too variegated, and the category itself too diffuse and ill-
structured, to yield to any “analysis”. 
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